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et al.: Trial by Jury

TRIAL BY JURY
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2:
Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been
guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate
forever; but a jury trialmay be waived by the parties in all civil
cases in the manner to be prescribedby law.
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Ribowskyl 364
(decided February 14, 1991)

The defendant, an attorney, contended that his right to be tried
in the county where the crime was allegedly committed, as construed under article I, section 2 of the New York State
Constitution, 136 5 was violated when the trial court failed to
submit the question to the jury of whether there was improper
venue to hear the case. The New York Court of Appeals held that
while the trial court erred by not submitting the question of venue
to the jury, it was harmless error because the jury's guilty verdict
inferred that the criminal act occurred in the county that asserted
1 366
jurisdiction.
The defendant was convicted of one count of first degree
conspiracy, six counts of offering a false instrument for filing in
the first degree and two counts of first degree perjury. This
conviction arose over a scheme to defraud insurance companies
by fabricating the injuries of automobile accident victims. As an
associate for the law offices of Stuart R. Kramer, P.C., 1367 the
1364. 77 N.Y.2d 284, 568 N.E.2d 1197, 567 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1991).
1365. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2.
1366. Ribowsky, 77 N.Y.2d at 294, 568 N.E.2d at 1203, 567 N.Y.S.2d at
398.
1367. The principal of this firm, Mr. Stuart Kramer, was already convicted
of various felony counts and disbarred because of his role in the insurance
scheme. See People v. Kramer, 132 A.D.2d 708, 518 N.Y.S.2d 189 (2d
Dep't), aff'd, 72 N.Y.2d 1003, 531 N.E.2d 633, 534 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1988);
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defendant was accused of "knowingly rel(ying] on . . . false
medical reports to represent claimants at arbitration hearings and
• . . settlement negotiations." ' 136 8 The defendant also conspired
with Kramer and another attorney of Kramer's firm, Stephen
Kihl, to allow Kihl to "use defendant's home as a business
address on retainer and closing statements filed with the Office of
Court Administration.", 1369 According to the court, this
"arrangement allowed the firm to conceal its dual representation
of both the driver and the passengers involved in an automobile
accident by using Kihl's name and defendant's address for one
' 137 0
client and the Kramer name and address for the other."
Lastly, the defendant was accused of making pejurious
statements before the Grievance Committees of both the Second
and Eleventh Judicial Districts regarding his role in the
scheme. 1371
The defendant argued, inter alia,1372 that his conyiction should
be overturned because the trial court failed to submit a separate
question of venue to the jury regarding the conspiracy count. 1373
Because the jury did not have this instruction, according to the
defendant, it is not known whether the jury believed that he and
his co-conspirators committed the alleged act in the county
asserting jurisdiction. In this case, the proper venue would be
Kings County because that was the location where the Grievance
13 74
Committee heard the defendant's perjurious testimony.
The court agreed with the defendant's claim that a trial error
was committed, but upheld the conviction because they ruled that
it was a harmless error. The court noted that a "defendant has the
In re Kramer, 120 A.D.2d 299, 509 N.Y.S.2d 47 (2d Dep't 1986).
1368. Ribowsky, 77 N.Y.2d at 288, 568 N.E.2d at 1199, 567 N.Y.S.2d at

394.
1369.
1370.
1371.
1372.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The defendant also argued that the perjury counts against him were

"duplicitous" and the manner in which they were submitted to the jury
constituted error. The court of appeals rejected these claims and concluded
"that there was no error requiring reversal of the perjury convictions." Id.
1373. Id.
1374. Id. at 297 n.1, 568 N.E.2d at 1202 n.1, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 397 n.1.
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right at common law and under the State Constitution to be tried
in the county where the crime was committed unless the
Legislature has provided otherwise." 1375 The court further noted
that the prosecution has to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the proper venue for the prosecution of the crime is
the same location as that where the crime was committed.
In regard to conspiracy, the proper venue can either be in the
county where the act was entered into or any county where an
overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Therefore, the trial court erred by not submitting a separate
question to the jury regarding proper venue. The court of appeals, however, found the error harmless because "it appears
from the verdict that the jury necessarily found that an overt act
occurred in the county asserting jurisdiction. ' 137 6 The court
noted that:
Because thd jury found defendant guilty of perjury in Kings
County beyond a reasonable doubt and the perjury constituted an
overt act in furtherance of an ongoing conspiracy, it necessarily
follows that the jury passed on the question of venue and found

by a preponderance of the evidence that at least one overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy was committed there. It could have
done no more if properly instructed and the failure to do so was
harmless. 137

7

The court cautioned, however, that to be considered harmless
error, there must be a showing that the jury, at least by implication, made a proper finding of venue. According to the court, it
is not enough for the trial record to merely contain evidence of
which county is the proper venue to adjudicate the action, or
evidence of an overt act in that county.

1375. Id. at 291, 568 N.E.2d at 1201, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 396 (citing People v.
Moore, 46 N.Y.2d 1, 385 N.E.2d 535, 412 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1978); People v.
Goldswer, 39 N.Y.2d 656, 350 N.E.2d 604, 385 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1976)).
1376. Id. at 292, 568 N.E.2d at 1202, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
1377. Id. at 294, 568 N.E.2d at 1203, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
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